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SURVEY OF SELECTED 2019
TEXAS OIL AND GAS CASES AND STATUTES
By: William D Farrar1
I. INTRODUCTION
Texas courts and the legislature were quite active in 2019
concerning oil and gas issues. Texas courts decided many cases
involving everything from deed interpretation to lease repudiation to
farmout interpretation. The Texas Supreme Court has granted several
petitions for review from the courts of appeal. The legislature enacted
or amended statutes concerning so called “royalty leases,” the Mineral
Interest Pooling Act, and others. The following are summaries of
some selected cases and statutes that will be of interest to those
involved with Texas oil and gas law.
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A. Oil and Gas Leases and Provisions
1. Offset Well Clauses
In Bell v. Chesapeake Energy Corp.2, the San Antonio Court
of Appeals used strict contract construction maxims to interpret an
“offset clause” in two oil and gas leases to require the lessee to pay
compensatory royalties. The relevant lease provisions generally
provided that if an offset well were drilled by a third party within 330
feet, or within 467 feet by the if the lessee had an economic interest in
it, then the lessee was required to drill a well, release acreage or pay
compensatory royalty.3 The lease defined the compensatory royalty
as “an amount equal to the Royalty Share of Gross Proceeds of
production from the Adjacent Well . . . .”4
The lessee first argued that the offset well provisions were not
triggered because the “reasonably prudent operator” standard was
implied in the offset clause,5 meaning even though a well was drilled
within the prescribed distance, the well is not a “triggering well”
unless it was causing substantial drainage and a reasonably prudent
operator would drill a protection well.6 The court noted that the offset
clauses expressly provided that a well drilled within the trigger
distance was a “draining well,” thus there was no requirement for the
lessor to prove substantial drainage, nor was there any language
implying a reasonably prudent operator standard.7 The court held that
the lessor “is not required to demonstrate anything other than the
existence of an Adjacent Well within the Trigger Distances that has
begun production” and thereafter the lessee must either drill, release
acreage, or pay the compensatory royalty.8
Secondly, the lessee argued that even if the offset clause were
triggered, the compensatory royalty should be based on something less

2. See No. 04-18-00129-CV, 2019 WL 1139584, at *1 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2019, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (noting that the case was an accelerated appeal
as a representative case of a class action).
3. Id.
4. Id. at *2.
5. Id. at *5.
6. Id.
7. Id. at *6.
8. Id.
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than the “Gross Proceeds” from the adjacent well.9 The court framed
the issue as “whether Gross Proceeds are from production from the
entirety of a horizontal well, any part of which falls within the Trigger
Distances, or production attributable only to those perforations (take
points) that are within those Trigger Distances.”10 The court noted that
lease offset clause expressly provided that the surface location of a
horizontal well was the determinative location of a well rather than the
“take points” or location of entry into the productive formation.11 In
seeking to reduce the amount of the “Gross Proceeds” to which the
royalty would be paid, the lessee argued that the lease provision did
not consider the “realities” of horizontal drilling. However, the court
noted that horizontal wells were discussed in the lease and held that
the lessee may not now introduce extrinsic evidence of “realities” of
horizontal drilling to “alter or contradict the unambiguous [l]ease
language.”12
The lessee’s argument was essentially “that calculating
Compensatory Royalty according to the plain language of the Leases
is a bad deal.”13 The court disagreed, noting that the lessee was a
sophisticated industry player, represented by experienced counsel, and
fully expected horizontal wells would be drilled. Accordingly, the
express language in the leases controlled requiring that the lessee pay
the compensatory royalty on the gross production from the adjacent
wells.14
2. Royalty Payments and Post-Production Cost Deductions
In Bluestone Nat. Res. II, LLC v. Randle, the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals construed royalty payment clauses in an oil and gas lease
to uphold the trial court’s determination that the lessee could not
deduct post-production costs from the lessor’s royalty.15 The lease in
9. Id. at *5
10. Id. at *12.
11. Id. at *13 (The relevant lease language stated “. . . in the case of a Horizontal
Well[,] distance will be measured from the surface location or the subsurface path
of a horizontal drainbore, from its point of entry into the productive horizon to its
terminus, whichever is closer”).
12. Id. at *14.
13. Id. at *15.
14. Id.
15. No. 02-18-00271-CV, 2019 WL 1716415, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2019, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
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question was described by lessee’s counsel as a “Frankenstein’s
Monster” with its parts “cobbled together from the parts bin of oil and
gas lease provisions.”16 The lease had a printed portion with an
Exhibit A attached as an addenda. The printed portion of the lease
contained a royalty clause that stated lessor’s royalty would be based
on:
the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so
sold or used, provided that on gas sold by Lessee the
market value shall not exceed the amount received by
Lessee for such gas computed at the mouth of the well,
and on gas sold at the well the royalty shall be oneeighth of the amount realized by Lessee from such sale
. . . .17
Exhibit A provided that “it is understood and agreed by all the
parties that the language on this Exhibit ‘A’ supersedes any provisions
to the contrary in the printed lease hereof.”18 Exhibit A also included
the following provision relating to royalty payments:
LESSEE AGREES THAT all royalties accruing under
this Lease (including those paid in kind) shall be
without deduction, directly or indirectly, for the cost of
producing, gathering, storing, separating, treating,
dehydrating, compressing, processing, transporting,
and otherwise making the oil, gas[,] and other
products hereunder ready for sale or use. Lessee
agrees to compute and pay royalties on the gross value
received, including any reimbursements for severance
taxes and production related costs.19
The court noted that typically there are three issues to consider:
(1) the fraction of royalty such as 1/4th or 1/8th; (2) the method of
16. Id. (In this author’s experience, this is fairly typical—leases many times are
assembled with a printed form and various addenda attached modifying, or adding
to, the printed form).
17. Id. at *2.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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valuation, such as “market value” or “proceeds”; and (3) the
geographic location at which the value or proceeds is determined, such
as “at the wellhead” or “at the point of sale.” Specifically, this case
involves the last two.20 “Proceeds” or “amount realized” is the
amount the lessee actually receives from a sale, while “market value”
requires payment of market price in the vicinity of the wellsite
irrespective of actual sales price.21 Market value can be determined
either through the “comparable sales method” or the “net-back
method.”22 The comparable sales method uses other sales that are
“comparable in time, quality, quantity, and availability of marketing
outlets.”23 The “net-back” method, “which determines the prevailing
market price at a given point and backs out the necessary, reasonable
costs between that point and the wellhead.”24
The court found that although the preprinted lease form called
for valuation based on “market value at the well,” which necessarily
allowed post-production cost deductions, Exhibit A to the lease
provided for valuation based on proceeds received by lessee.25 The
court pointed out that although identical proceeds language on Exhibit
A had been held to be “mere surplusage” in Heritage Resources v.
Nationsbank,26 However, the court enforced the proceeds valuation
based on the Exhibit A language stating that Exhibit A controlled over
the preprinted lease form in the event of any conflict. Accordingly, the
lessee could not deduct post-production costs from the lessor’s
royalty.
3. Lease Repudiation by Lessor
In Lona Hills Ranch, LLC v. Creative Oil and Gas Operating,
LLC,27 the Austin Court of Appeals determined that the Texas Citizens

20. Id. at *4. See also Byron C. Keeling, In the New Era of Oil and Gas Royalty
Accounting: Drafting a Royalty Clause That Actually Says What the Parties Intend
It to Mean, 69 Baylor L. Rev. 516, 520–528 (2017).
21. Bluestone Nat. Res., 2019 WL 1716415, at *8–9.
22. Id. at *5.
23. Id. (quoting Heritage Res. v. Nations Bank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex.
1996)).
24. Id. (quoting Heritage Res., 939 S.W.2d at 130).
25. Id. at *16.
26. Id.
27. 549 S.W.3d 839 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019) (pet. granted).
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Participation Act (“TCPA”)28 did not preclude the lessee from
pursuing a breach of contract claim against the lessor for failure to
comply with a “notice before litigation” clause in the lease. The lessor
first filed a complaint at the Texas Railroad Commission based on lack
of production, challenging the operator’s “good faith claim” of the
right to continue to operate the lease.29 The Railroad Commission
dismissed the complaint, finding the operator had shown a good faith
claim to continue to operate the well.30 The lessor did not appeal this
decision but instead initiated litigation in the district court against the
operator for trespass to try title and trespass based on allegations of
lack of production.31
The operator filed an answer and noted it was a contract
operator only and owned no interest in the well or lease and filed
counterclaims alleging the lessor had interfered with the sale of oil
produced, wrongfully filed the Railroad Commission complaint, and
breached the lease by failing to comply with the lease’s pre-suit notice
requirements, which would have given the lessee an opportunity to
cure.32 The lessee intervened in the suit and filed its own counterclaim
against the lessor for breach of contract.33 The lessor filed a motion
to dismiss both counterclaims under the TCPA. The trial court never
ruled on lessor’s motion, thus it was denied by operation of law and
addressed for the first time on appeal.34
The appellate court found that the lessor had met its prima
facie standard for dismissal under the TCPA, but then analyzed the
operator’s response to determine if it could prove each element of its
breach of contract claims.35 The court determined that the trial court
should have dismissed the operator’s counterclaim because, as a nonparty to the lease allegedly breached, the operator could never prove a
breach of contract.36 With respect to the lessee’s counterclaim, the
court found that the lessor had failed to establish grounds for dismissal
because the notice before litigation clause in the lease was a
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001 (2018).
Lona Hills Ranch, 549 S.W.3d at 842.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 843.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 848.
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contractual limitation on the lessor’s right to petition under the
TCPA.37
B. Mineral Ownership
1. Executive Rights and Duties to Non-Executives
In Tex. Outfitters, Ltd. v. Nicholson,38 the Texas Supreme
Court held that an executive mineral owner breached its duty of utmost
good faith in failing to execute a mineral lease. Texas Outfitters, the
owner of the surface estate, and a minority mineral interest also held
the executive rights to 50% of the mineral estate.39 The other 50% of
the mineral estate was owned by others.40 A lessee leased the 50%
mineral interest owned by others and offered the same lease terms to
Texas Outfitters for the remaining 50%.
Texas Outfitters declined to lease, believing that lease bonus
amounts might go even higher and to protect his hunting business,
despite the non-executive owner’s desire that the lease be executed.41
Thereafter, the non-executives requested a meeting with Texas
Outfitters and proposed a resolution whereby they would purchase the
executive rights to their mineral interest, forgive part of a sellerfinanced note that Texas Outfitters owed them, and they would lease
all their minerals.42 However, no deal was reached because the parties
were unable to agree on the specific terms of surface restrictions. The
non-executives filed suit against the executive for breaching the duty
of utmost good faith and fair dealing for failing to enter into a lease.43
At a bench trial, judgment was entered against the executive
owner for $867,654.32, the amount of the bonus the non-executives
would have received.44 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that
“the evidence supports a finding that Texas Outfitters refused to
execute the . . . lease based on its arbitrary and self-motivated refusal
to permit any lease for the purpose of protecting its use of the surface
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
572 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. 2019).
Id. at 649.
Id.
Id. at 650.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and to exact a benefit from the [non-executive] [e.g., the note
reduction and deed restrictions] to their detriment.”45
The Texas Supreme Court first reiterated the law regarding the
executive’s duty to the non-executives:
1. [T]he duty does not require an executive to
subjugate his interests to those of the nonexecutive; rather, the executive must ‘acquire for
the non-executive every benefit that he exacts for
himself.46
2. An executive is not ‘wholly shielded from liability
for inaction, i.e., failure to lease, noting that if an
executive’s refusal to lease upon request ‘is
arbitrary or motivated by self-interest to the nonexecutive’s detriment, the executive may have
breached his duty.’47
Applying these principles, the Court stated they “cannot be
applied in a vacuum and must account for the fact that executives and
non-executives often ‘do not share in all the same
economic benefits that might be derived from a mineral
lease,’”48 and “evaluating compliance with the executive duty is
rarely straightforward and is heavily dependent on the facts and
circumstances.”49 The Court then noted that the trial court had made
numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law and its review on
appeal was to determine if “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence
exists to uphold the trial court’s judgment and the court of appeals
affirmation in favor of the non-executive.50
In affirming the judgments below, the Court noted that the
executive owner knew that 50% of the minerals had already been
leased to a lessee and “gambling” that a higher offer would come in
from a different lessee was highly unlikely and gambled

45. Id. at 651–52.
46. Id. at 652 (quoting KCM Fin., LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 74 (Tex.
2015)).
47. Id. at 652 (quoting Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd., 352 S.W.3d 479, 491 (Tex.
2011)).
48. Id. at 652 (quoting KCM Fin., 457 S.W.3d at 82).
49. Id. at 653.
50. Id. at 653.
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disproportionality with the non-executive’s interest as compared to the
executive’s, and solely to benefit the executive’s surface estate.51
2. Co-tenancy of the Mineral Estate
In Cimarex Energy Co, v. Anadarko Pet. Co., the El Paso Court
of Appeals held that one co-tenant’s production activities on land
would not perpetuate another co-tenant’s oil and lease on an undivided
interest in the same land.52 Cimarex owned a lease with a five-year
primary term on an undivided 1/6th mineral interest in 440 acres.53
Anadarko owned leases on the other 5/6ths mineral interest. Anadarko
also had the lease on an adjacent 200 acres.54 Anadarko drilled two
wells on the 440 acres, both of which paid out and produced in paying
quantities thereafter.55 Cimarex requested to participate in the costs
of the development of the two wells, and Anadarko refused.56
Anadarko then applied for a permit to drill a well on the 200-acre
lease.57 The well’s location was too close to the 440 acres for a regular
permit, thus Anadarko filed for a Rule 37 exception permit and
notified Cimarex of the application.58 Cimarex failed to object to the
permit application, and the permit was granted. Anadarko thereafter
drilled and completed a successful well.59 The lessors of the Cimarex
lease then executed top leases covering the 1/6th interest to a third party
that were then acquired by Anadarko.60 Thus, Anadarko held leases
on 5/6th mineral interest and top leases on 1/6th mineral interest.
After Anadarko failed to provide information on the wells or
an accounting, Cimarex filed suit seeking an accounting for its 1/6th
co-tenant share of the net profits for the wells located on the 440 acres.
Additionally, Cimarex attempted to force pool some of the land
covered by its lease at the Texas Railroad Commission into the well
located on the adjacent 200 acres using the Mineral Interest Pooling
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 657.
574 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019).
Id. at 80–81.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 81–82.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id.
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Act.61 Cimarex and Anadarko thereafter reached a settlement in which
Anadarko agreed to pay Cimarex 1/6th of the net profits for the two
wells located on the 440 acres and to provide income and expense data
and payments of net profits on an ongoing basis.62 Cimarex paid its
lessors their royalty on the production as well.63 Anadarko performed
under the terms of the settlement agreement, but when the five-year
primary term of the Cimarex lease ended, Anadarko stopped
performing, claiming Cimarex’s leasehold interested had terminated
because Cimarex had not established production on its lease to
perpetuate the lease into the secondary term.64
Cimarex then filed suit against Anadarko.65 Both parties filed
motions for summary judgment.66 Anadarko defended its position and
the superiority of its top leases on the basis that the Cimarex lease
required Cimarex to establish production and that the activities of
Anadarko, Cimarex’s co-tenant, were not sufficient to do so.67
Cimarex argued that the lease only required production “on the lands
covered by the lease.” Their reasoning was that since Anadarko had
established production on the same lands the lease was perpetuated
and because Cimarex had paid royalties to its lessors, both they, and
Anadarko as the top lessee standing in the same shoes, were equitably
estopped from repudiating the Cimarex lease.68 The trial court
disagreed, finding that the Cimarex lease had expired at the end of its
five-year primary term and that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was
not applicable.69
On appeal, the parties reasserted the same arguments as below.
The court of appeals relied heavily on Hughes v. Cantwell,70 where the
court held that a lessee of a lease covering a fractional co-tenant
interest in minerals is required to undertake drilling activities and may
not rely on the activities of its co-tenant.71 The court explained as its
61. Id. at 83.
62. Id. at 83–84.
63. Id. at 84.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 65.
69. Id.
70. 540 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1976) (writ ref’d. n.r.e.).
71. Id. at 90–93; Cimarex Energy Co. v. Andarko Petroleum, 574 S.W.3d 73
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2019).
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reasoning in Hughes that the lease stated in several places that the
“lessee” was authorized or obligated to do certain things, such as pay
delay rentals, pool the lease, pay royalties, thus the option to either
drill a well or pay delay rentals was an option for Hughes. Therefore,
the fact that a co-tenant had commenced drilling operations did not
keep the Hughes lease from terminating when Hughes elected not to
pay delay rentals.72 The court further explained that in order to rely
on a co-tenant’s activities, one must participate, actually or
constructively, in paying their share of the drilling costs.73
Following their opinion in Hughes, the court noted that the
Cimarex lease likewise authorized or required the “lessee” to explore
for and produce oil and gas; pay royalties; undertake reworking or new
drilling operations; pool the lease; designate pooled units; assign the
lease; use oil, gas and water from the land for operations; and finally,
to remove its equipment after lease termination.74 Thus, reasoned the
court, it is implied “that the lessors intended for Cimarex to be the one
to cause production on the property in order to extend the lease into
the secondary term.”75
Cimarex next argued that it had paid royalties to the lessors
based on Anadarko’s production, and “it would be inherently
inconsistent to interpret the lease to require it to pay royalties on
Anadarko’s production during the primary term, while not allowing
Cimarex to rely on Anadarko’s production to keep the lease alive into
the secondary term.”76 However, the court disagreed, stating that it
was entirely possible that the lessors could have intended that royalties
be paid on a co-tenants production during the primary term, but to
require its lessee, Cimarex, to establish its own production to
perpetuate the lease into the secondary term.77 Cimarex next argued
that it would be bad public policy to hold that one co-tenant’s activities
would not perpetuate another co-tenant’s lease and would discourage
the leasing of minority mineral interests given that it is typically
uneconomic for a minority co-tenant to undertake the financial risk of
drilling a well.78 However, the court disagreed, observing that:
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Cimarex Energy Co., 574 S.W.3d at 91.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 94–95.
Id. at 95.
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Cimarex was aware of the laws relating to co-tenancy
when it entered into the lease agreeing to take a
minority interest… [and] Cimarex knowingly took the
risk that other tenants on the land might refuse to agree
to a joint operating agreement, and that it might be
forced to, at some point, commence production on its
own, as contemplated by the terms of the lease.79
Cimarex next argued that its Settlement Agreement with
Anadarko was a joint operating agreement, meaning Cimarex and
Anadarko were jointly developing the lands, and the Cimarex lease
was perpetuated by the efforts of both Cimarex and Anadarko.80
Anadarko countered that the Settlement Agreement did nothing more
than recognize Cimarex was entitled to its non-developing cotenant
share of the net profits.81 The court agreed with Anadarko, pointing
out that while no particular form of agreement is required to be a joint
operating agreement, the hallmarks of an operating agreement are to
share revenues, share expenses, allocate liabilities, designate an
operator, and define the geographic area to which it applies.82 These
attributes were juxtaposed to the Settlement Agreement, which merely
recognized Cimarex as a 1/6th co-tenant entitled to a 1/6th co-tenant’s
share of net income. The Settlement Agreement omitted any reference
to joint development, responsibility of costs and liabilities, and indeed
referenced Cimarex as a “non-participating cotenant,” as opposed to a
“non-operator.”83
Finally, Cimarex argued that its lessors, and Anadarko by
virtue of the top lease, were equitably estopped from claiming
Cimarex’s lease terminated because the lessors accepted royalties on
Anadarko’s production during the primary term. The court dispensed
with this argument stating: “we have interpreted the habendum clause
in the Cimarex lease to require Cimarex to pay royalties on any
production on the land during the “paid-up” primary term of the lease,
while requiring Cimarex to cause actual production on the subject
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 96.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id.
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property to extend the lease into the secondary term.”84 Finally, the
court upheld the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Anadarko as
a “prevailing party” under the attorney’s fee provision of the
Settlement Agreement.85 The holding in the Cimarex case is a warning
that when taking an oil and gas lease on a fractional interest, the lessee
should include language in the lease that would recognize a cotenant’s operations or production for purposes of perpetuating the
lease. It is the author’s observation that this case is contrary to the
assumption that a mineral lessee stands in the shoes of its lessor with
respect to co-tenancy law, while honoring the general proposition that
Texas jurisprudence over the years has tended to support those who
are spending money, thereby incurring risk, to bring oil and gas to the
surface, as opposed to those who passively rely on other’s efforts. It
will be interesting to see the result if petition is granted on this case.
3. Consent to Assign Clauses
In Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. v. Carizzo Oil & Gas, Inc.,86 the
Texas Supreme Court found that Carrizo had an unqualified right to
refuse to consent to Barrow-Shaver’s transfer of rights under a farmout
agreement. Carizzo held oil and gas leases on 22,000 acres that were
about to expire.87 Prior to the farmout agreement being executed, the
parties negotiated various drafts of the agreement, including the
wording of the consent to assign clause that provided that consent
could not be withheld unreasonably. Testimony at trial stated that
Carizzo refused to qualify the language in the agreement but had
verbally promised it would consent in the event Barrow-Shaver ever
wanted to assign its rights.88 The parties ultimately entered into the
farmout agreement that contained the following clause:
The rights provided to [Barrow-Shaver] under this
Letter Agreement may not be assigned, subleased or

84. Id. at 100.
85. Id. at 101,
86. Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. v. Carizzo Oil & Gas, Inc., No. 17-0332, 2019 WL
2668317 (Tex. June 28, 2019).
87. Id. at *2.
88. Id. at *2–3.
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otherwise transferred in whole or in part, without the
express written consent of Carrizo.89
Barrow-Shaver spent over $22,000,000 drilling an
unsuccessful well on the lands covered by the farmout agreement.90
Thereafter, a third party offered to purchase Barrow-Shaver’s interest
in the farmout agreement for approximately $27,000,000.91 BarrowShaver requested that Carizzo consent to the assignment of the
farmout agreement to the third party.92 Carizzo refused to consent,
instead offering to sell its interest in the leases to Barrow-Shaver for
$5,000,000.93 Barrow-Shaver refused to purchase the farmout
agreement, and the underlying leases expired worthless.94
Barrow-Shaver sued Carizzo for breach of contract, fraud, and
tortious interference with a contract.95 At trial, both parties agreed that
the consent to assign clause was unambiguous, but Barrow-Shaver
also argued that the contract was silent on the bases that Carizzo could
refuse to consent.96 The trial court refused to admit prior drafts of the
farmout agreement in which Carizzo had deleted the phrase “which
consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.”97 Both parties proffered
expert testimony on industry custom and usage, with respect to the
standards governing when consent to assign can be withheld. BarrowShaver’s expert opined that a standard of good faith governed, and that
the request for $5,000,000 was a breach of the farmout agreement.
Carizzo’s expert opined that the clause was a “hard consent,” and
Carizzo could refuse to consent for any reason.98 At trial, the jury
found that Carizzo had breached the farmout agreement and awarded
almost $28,000,000 damages and attorney’s fees to Barrow-Shaver.99
Carizzo appealed, and the 12th Court of Appeals reversed, finding that
the trial court erred in not allowing the prior drafts of the farmout
agreement into evidence to show that Carizzo had bargained for “hard
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
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consent.”100 The appellate court also held that the existence of a
written contract vitiated any cause of action based on fraud, and since
Carizzo had the right to withhold consent, there could be no tortious
interference with contract.101 Barrow-Shaver petitioned to the Texas
Supreme Court, which was granted.
The Texas Supreme Court ultimately held that the farmout
agreement was unambiguous, and neither the prior drafts of the
agreement, nor industry custom and usage, were admissible. In
reaching this decision, the Court found that there was no breach of
contract in refusing to consent because the plain wording of the
agreement gave Carizzo the right to refuse to consent for any reason.
The court held:
The consent-to-assign provision plainly states that
Barrow-Shaver cannot assign its rights unless it obtains
Carrizo’s consent, which must be express and in
writing. In other words, Carrizo has a right to consent
to a proposed assignment, or not. The plain language
of the provision imposes no obligation on Carrizo—it
does not require Carrizo to consent when certain
conditions are satisfied, require Carrizo to provide a
reason for withholding consent, or subject Carrizo to
any particular standard for withholding consent.102
The majority found that there were no material terms in the
consent to assign clause. Therefore, there was no need to allow
extrinsic evidence to explain “immaterial terms.”103 The Court also
found that industry custom and usage were not admissible when the
clause was otherwise unambiguous.104
In response to Barrow-Shaver’s argument that a duty of good
faith is imposed on Carizzo in its decision whether to consent or not,
the Court held “this Court has been clear that absent a special
relationship, parties to a contract have no duty to act in good faith.”105
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *26–37.
Id. at *41.
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The court pointed out that in its view, a farmout agreement between
sophisticated parties is not similar to the relationship between insurers
and insureds with unequal bargaining power.106 Finally, the Court
found no fraud cause of action was available to Barrow-Shaver
because the direct language of the farmout agreement contradicted the
alleged oral promise by Carizzo to consent if requested.107
The dissenting opinion noted that industry custom and usage
evidence are routinely admitted to explain an otherwise unambiguous
contract, citing the classic example of a “baker’s dozen” not being a
dozen but thirteen.108 Explaining further, the dissent noted “this Court
has noted that a ‘thousand’ rabbits may mean 1,200; a ‘day’ may mean
10 hours; and ‘4,000’ shingles may mean 4500,”109 and the majority
holding “that trade custom and usage has no applicability to terms that
are ‘not susceptible to more than one [meaning[] and [are] not industry
or vocation specific” is manifestly wrong.”110
It should be noted that a petition for rehearing has been filed
in this case. The holding in this case has potential impact beyond a
farmout agreement, which was at issue in this case. Many exploration
agreements, oil and gas leases, pipeline easements, and others have
consent to assign clauses. It is the author’s experience that if a party
wishes to withhold consent with unfettered discretion, the consent to
assign clause should add a qualifier such as “may withhold consent in
its sole discretion” or “may withhold consent for any reason,” and
absent such qualifier, there should be a commercially valid reason for
refusing to consent. The take-a-way from this case is that the Texas
Supreme Court has adopted a very non-industry specific reading of
contracts—if the contract words appear in a dictionary, then one need
not consult industry custom and trade usage.
II. Statutory Changes
A. “Royalty Leases” and Addition of Section 5.152 of the Texas
Property Code

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at *41–42.
Id. at *65–66.
Id. at *84.
Id.
Id. at *84–85.
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In recent years, there have been an increasing number of
disputes arising over purported “royalty leases,” whereby a buyer
purports to “lease” the royalty interest a party owns in lands that are
already leased or under production. The buyers of the purported
“leases” argue that the fact that the instrument is entitled or written as
a lease does not prevent its effectiveness to convey a term royalty
interest or a defeasible fee. Some of the bases of the dispute can be
found in the class action suit entitled Danna Sue Bridges et al v. Ridge
Natural Resources.111 The gist of the complaint is that mineral/royalty
owners receive what appears at first glance to be a typical oil, gas, and
mineral lease, and they assume it is on lands not currently leased, or is
a “top lease.” However, the buyer claims that the “lease” is actually a
conveyance, usually of the grantor’s share of existing royalty in
existing production from lands already under lease, rather than a lease
on unproductive land that would require exploration efforts to
perpetuate the lease. Some of the “royalty leases” include arbitration
clauses that require any disputes to be resolved through binding
arbitration.112
The Texas legislature added section 5.152 of the Texas
Property Code, effective September 1, 2019, to require additional
notices and requirements when attempting to acquire permanently, or
for a term, the mineral interest or royalty interest a lessor has in an
existing oil and gas lease.113 Among the requirements are that a notice
in 14 point typeface stating: “THIS IS NOT AN OIL AND GAS
LEASE. YOU ARE SELLING ALL OR A PORTION OF YOUR
MINERAL OR ROYALTY INTERESTS IN (DESCRIPTION OF
PROPERTY BEING CONVEYED)” must appear on each page of the
lease and immediately above the signature line.114 If the notices are
not included, the instrument is void, as opposed to voidable.115
The new statute provides for the recovery of all oil and gas
revenues paid to the purported lessee, costs, and attorney’s fees.116
Finally, the statute is cumulative with other remedies, thus a
111. Class Action Complaint, Danna Sue Bridges et al v. Ridge Natural
Resources, No. 7:18-cv-00134-DC, 2018 WL 10072188 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2018).
112. Ridge Nat. Res. v. Double Eagle Royalty, 564 S.W.3d 105, 116 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2018, no pet.).
113. TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.152 (2019).
114. § 5.152(c).
115. § 5.152(d).
116. § 5.152(e).
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complainant could, for example, also bring claims for common law
fraud, statutory fraud, and others.117
B. Mineral Interest Pooling Act Amendments
The Texas legislature, effective September 1, 2019, amended
the Mineral Interest Pooling Act to provide that a unit formed under
the Act will dissolve two years after formation if no drilling occurs in
the unit or surface location for the unit.118 The prior version of the
statute required dissolution at the end of one year.
C. Ownership of Fluid Oil & Gas Waste
The Texas legislature, effective September 1, 2019, amended
Texas Natural Resources Code section 122.002 to provide that a
person or entity that acquires fluid oil and gas waste for the purposes
of treating it for further beneficial use, owns the fluid waste, absent
“an oil or gas lease, a surface use agreement, a contract, a bill of sale,
or another legally binding document to the contrary.”119 Presumably,
the purpose of this amendment is to resolve a dispute between a
surface owner, mineral owner, and lessee over who has the right to the
fluid waste, which could be quite valuable given the scarcity of water
in some areas.

117. § 5.152(f).
118. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 102.082 (2019).
119. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 122.002 (2019).

